Papers

The Noumenality Myth (under review)

Abstract: There is a long-standing debate about whether our perceptions transparently reveal the nature of worldly objects. Another debate is about whether the objects of perception place any constraints on the phenomenal character of veridical perception. There is a consensus that these debates are related: endorsing fully transparent perception requires character constraints on veridical perception. This paper attacks that consensus. The consensus requires positing a family of properties whose metaphysical status is much more peculiar than is generally appreciated. These “noumenal” properties are allegedly essential to explaining the veridicality of our perceptions, yet no clear explanation is available for how we can learn about them or why we should postulate them. I argue that they do not exist.

Against Character Constraints (under review, AJP R&R)

Abstract: This paper defends the following principle: For any visually perceptible set of objects and any visual phenomenal character, there could be a veridical perception of exactly those objects with that character. This principle is rejected by almost all contemporary theories of perception, yet rarely addressed directly. Many have taken the apparent inconceivability of a certain sort of “shape inversion” – as compared to the more plausible, frequently discussed “color inversion” – as evidence that the spatial characters of our perceptions are uniquely suited to and/or revelatory of the structure of their objects, such that alleged perceptions of those objects that differed radically in spatial character could not be veridical. I argue that these conclusions are unjustified: I claim that the difficulty involved in constructing coherent “shape inversion” scenarios is attributable to the complex relations among visual and tactile shape experiences, as opposed to the relations between shape experiences and worldly shape properties.

Why Self Trust is Truth Conducive (in progress: to be presented at 2024 Central APA)

Abstract: You believe P. You learn that Lily believes ￢P. Until now, you’ve thought Lily extremely similar to yourself with respect to intelligence, rationality, and priviness to relevant evidence — everything that should make her your equal at discerning whether P.  How, if at all, should you reassess your belief in P? Since Kelly’s 2005 “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement”, much discussion has been devoted to this dilemma. Some say it’s irrational to continue to believe that P is more likely than ￢P.  A variety of complex justifications for self-trust have been suggested. In this paper, I offer a comparatively simple defense of self-trust based on its likelihood to lead to truth. Specifically, I argue that if — as I suggest is the case — there are positive correlations between one’s chances of obeying epistemic policies at different orders of evaluation for a given proposition P, self-trust will lead to truth more often than not.